Tensions between Iran, the United States, and Israel did not arise overnight. They are the result of more than four decades of ideological conflict, geopolitical rivalry, and mutual distrust that began in 1979. It was the Islamic Revolution that transformed Iran from a key U.S. ally into one of its staunchest adversaries in the Middle East.
Before the revolution, Iran was a pillar of U.S. strategy in the region. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was an authoritarian ruler, yet at the same time a guarantor of the country’s pro-Western orientation. The fall of the monarchy and the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini marked a fundamental shift. From the outset, the Islamic Republic defined itself in part as an opposition to “American imperialism,” and later also to the existence of the State of Israel. The hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy symbolically closed the era of alliance.
The hostage drama in Tehran began on November 4, 1979, when a group of Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in the city center. The attackers claimed they were responding to the U.S. decision to admit the deposed shah for medical treatment, which they saw as proof of continued American interference in Iranian affairs. During the assault, they took 66 diplomats and embassy staff hostage; some were later released, but 52 Americans remained in captivity. The new revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini supported the crisis and used it to consolidate power at home. The United States responded by freezing Iranian assets and severing diplomatic relations with Tehran. A rescue attempt in April 1980 ended in fiasco after U.S. helicopters crashed in the Iranian desert. The hostages spent a total of 444 days in captivity, often in isolation and under psychological pressure. The crisis significantly weakened President Jimmy Carter’s position and influenced the 1980 U.S. presidential election. The hostages were released on January 20, 1981, the day of Ronald Reagan’s inauguration. This event definitively sealed the hostile relations between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which persist to this day.
The Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 deepened this antagonism even further. The United States supported Saddam Hussein during the conflict, which Tehran saw as proof that Washington was prepared to back any regime if it served its strategic interests. From this period emerged Iran’s security doctrine, built on the conviction that it is better to shift conflict beyond its own territory than to wait until it arrives at home.
A decisive turning point came after 2001. Following the September 11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan and, two years later, Iraq. Iran suddenly found itself between two countries hosting U.S. military forces: Iraq to the west and Afghanistan to the east. At the same time, the George W. Bush administration designated Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil.” In Tehran, this reinforced the belief that it was only a matter of time before the Islamic Republic itself became a target. The sense of strategic encirclement strengthened the hardline stance of Iran’s security apparatus and accelerated the building of a network of allies and allied armed groups across the region.
Iran began systematically supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza. From Tehran’s perspective, this forms a defensive belt intended to deter Israel and the United States from launching an attack. From the viewpoint of its adversaries, it represents a destabilizing policy and the export of revolution. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and especially the chaotic exit from Afghanistan in 2021, Iran interprets as confirmation that this strategy is correct. Official discourse now includes the narrative that patient resistance and regional alliances contributed to “driving out” the U.S. from the area. This is not a conventional military victory, but rather a political and symbolic strengthening of Iran’s position.
However, this policy also comes at a domestic cost. Iran faces long-term sanctions, high inflation, a weakened currency, and dissatisfaction among parts of the population. Many Iranians openly say that money is being directed toward foreign conflicts instead of addressing social problems at home. In the streets, people are asking why the country is investing in fighting in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or supporting Hamas in Gaza when its own citizens are struggling with rising prices and uncertainty. A deeper reflection is also emerging: if Iran criticizes the United States for interfering in other countries, overthrowing regimes, and arming allied groups, how exactly does its own policy differ? The regime speaks of defense and support for the oppressed, while critics see the same power logic that Tehran itself condemns.
Into this situation comes a decisive moment. Khamenei has died at the age of 86, and in exile as well as among parts of the public, monarchist flags have appeared along with hopes for better times. The reality, however, will be far more complex. The leader’s death is not an automatic defeat for the state. Iran’s political system is interwoven through clerical institutions, the security apparatus, and the Revolutionary Guards. The question of succession has been discussed for years, and although the answer has never been straightforward, it is likely that several prepared scenarios exist. His son Mojtaba Khamenei is mentioned, for example, although a dynastic approach has opponents in the country. The names of other clerical figures are also surfacing, including descendants of the republic’s founder.
Iran is officially an Islamic Republic, but its political system is a combination of a republic and a theocracy—that is, rule by religious authority. On the surface, it appears to be a state with elections and a president; in reality, however, decisive power rests in the hands of the Supreme Leader, a cleric.
The highest authority in the country is the Supreme Leader, titled Ayatollah. He is not directly elected by citizens. Iranians do go to the polls, but they vote for the Assembly of Experts—a body of 88 clerics who have the right to select and, in theory, dismiss the Supreme Leader. Even this process is not entirely open, as candidates for the Assembly of Experts must first be approved by the Guardian Council, an institution closely tied to the regime. The system is thus designed to allow only ideologically acceptable candidates to enter. Since 1989, the Supreme Leader has been Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
It is precisely the Supreme Leader who holds the greatest real power. He controls the armed forces, including the Revolutionary Guards, the security apparatus, state media, and the judiciary. He has decisive influence over foreign policy, security matters, and the nuclear program. He appoints key figures in the system and significantly shapes the composition of the Guardian Council, which in turn oversees the entire political process.
The President of Iran is directly elected by citizens for a four-year term, but his powers are limited. He heads the government and manages the economy, represents the country abroad, and has some room to maneuver in economic policy. However, he cannot act against the line set by the Supreme Leader. Moreover, presidential candidates must also be pre-approved by the Guardian Council, meaning only those deemed acceptable by the regime can stand in elections.
Iran’s system is therefore a mix of elections and strict religious control. Citizens vote, and there is a parliament and a president, but above all stands a religious authority that has the final say. Formally, it is a republic; in practice, it is a theocratic state in which political power derives from religious principles and ultimate decisions rest with the Supreme Leader.
One thing is to elect a new Supreme Leader; another is the country’s direction. Iran could enter a period of consolidation and a return to negotiations, with the regime preserved, perhaps under a more pragmatic or slightly more liberal face. Equally possible is that power shifts even further into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards, creating a harder, security-oriented model of state governance. Nor can a scenario of internal disintegration be ruled out. Iran is a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse country, and a weakening of the center could lead to regional tensions or attempts at greater autonomy, for example in Baluchistan. Part of the diaspora dreams of a return of the Pahlavi dynasty, but within Iran itself, the memory of the monarchy’s repressive practices remains vivid. And the idea of a rapid emergence of a stable democracy, however appealing, runs up against the experiences of Iraq and Libya, where external intervention brought more chaos than a functioning political system.
Despite its strong rhetoric, Iran today finds itself in a deep existential crisis. This threatens not only its military capabilities but also its political order and elites. It did not begin a few days ago; it has been escalating for years, and the present moment could represent its peak. One of the tools Tehran employs is the regionalization of the conflict—attacks on neighboring states hosting U.S. bases or the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. The logic is clear: if war comes, its cost should not be borne by Iran alone, but by the entire region. The loss of top leadership therefore does not necessarily mean an end to attacks or to confrontation.
The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between Oman and Iran that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the open Indian Ocean. At its narrowest point, it is approximately 33 kilometers wide, with shipping lanes even narrower, making it one of the most sensitive chokepoints in global transportation.
Its significance is primarily energy-related. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil trade and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas exports, especially from Qatar, pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Oil from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran itself must pass through this strait if it is destined for global markets. Any disruption to shipping would have an immediate impact on energy prices and the global economy.
The strait is not “owned” by a single country. Its northern coast belongs to Iran, and its southern coast to Oman (specifically the Omani enclave of Musandam). Under international law, it is an international strait through which ships have the right of so-called transit passage. This means that even though the coastal waters belong to Iran and Oman, they cannot arbitrarily halt international maritime traffic.
However, Iran has repeatedly suggested that in the event of a military conflict it could block the strait—for example, by mining it or launching attacks on tankers. Since its coastline controls the northern side and it possesses naval and missile capabilities in the area, it has the ability to significantly disrupt shipping, even though a complete and long-term closure would be militarily and politically very difficult.
Precisely for this reason, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most strategic places on the planet: it is a narrow chokepoint through which energy flows to a large part of the world. Any tension between Iran and the United States or its allies automatically raises fears of a possible blockade—and thus of a global energy crisis.
Along with Khamenei, several high-ranking figures in the security apparatus were also killed—Ali Shamkhani, General Abdolrahim Musavi, Aziz Nasirzadeh, and Mohammad Pakpour. Nevertheless, mass mourning ceremonies took place across the country, attended by thousands of people. The Iranian regime has its opponents, but also a solid base of supporters.
The hostility between Iran, the U.S., and Israel is thus not merely a matter of ideology, but also of security logic and power calculations. Each side acts in the name of its own protection. The problem is that these logics mutually exclude one another. And that is precisely why the future of Iran is a question that extends far beyond its borders.
The regime has not only numerous domestic opponents but also a large base of supporters. It cannot therefore be said that everyone wishes for the overthrow of the current ruler. To simplify, the urban intelligentsia longs for regime change but lacks clarity on what alternative should replace it. The rural population, by contrast, largely supports the existing order.
